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Preface 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed, and how 
does the implementation of such agreements influence their effectiveness? These are the 
questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation and Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Com~nitments (IEC)." 
A challenge to such research is the fact that hundreds of factors influence the extent to 
which international environmental commitments are implemented effectively within different 
countries. Is there a parsimonious theory that makes sense of this diversity and offers a 
powerful tool for predicting how states will implement international commitments and when 
implementation will be effective'? One candidate is "cultural theory," which posits that 
people fall into a small number of cultural types, which in turn uniquely explain their 
preferred styles of decision making and behavior. If true, cultural theory could also be a 
powerful tool to explain how people, and like-minded groups of people, agree upon and 
implement policies, including policies to address common international environmental 
problems. 
In this paper, Anne K. Johnson develops five "predictions" of cultural theory and uses 
them to "test" the extent to which the theory adequately describes the behavior of three 
countries: Japan, Sweden, and the United States, which, she argues, are representative of the 
three main cultural types. For each country she applies the tests to the global warming 
policies developed and implemented through 1992, when the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was adopted. While many studies explore how countries implement policies 
after international rules are agreed, this "pre-regime implementation" is interesting because 
these countries varied markedly in the ways in which they viewed the problem of global 
warming and what policy instruments they should implement to slow global warming. 
According to Johnson, cultural theory does well in explaining the behavior of these 
three states: cultural theory is not falsified in 73% (I I of 15) of the tests she applies. 
This work was conducted in 1994 while Johnson visited IIASA with financing from 
BattellelPacific Northwest Laboratories (United States) and the IEC project. IEC's research is 
not conducted in the cultural theory framework, but this study is one effort to ensure that the 
IEC research explores a wide range of theories. 
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Abstract 
This paper tests the claims of cultural theory using the formation of climate change 
policies in Sweden, the United States and Japan as case studies. Cultural theory is fre- 
quently employed by social scientists to explain various aspects of human behavior. The 
theory posits that any social group consists of three main cultural types: the egalitarian, 
the market-oriented, and the hierarchical. Though all groups contain elements of each, 
one cultural type usually predominates, giving the group its unique decision-making 
character. In the egalitarian group, for example, decision-making is based on broad 
consensus of the group, and decisions are aimed at providing equal benefits to all 
members. In a market culture, by contrast, the primary focus is on maximizing benefits 
to the individual. Decisions are oftcn made based on market principles (i.e., relative 
prices). In a hierarchy-dominant society, decision-making is highly centralized, with a 
few powerful bodies making decisions for the entire society. This type of group tends to 
be very bureaucratic, with a great deal of emphasis on administrative procedure. This 
paper applies cultural theory at the national level and tests to what extent the theory is 
able to project how countries will respond i n  addressing the issue of global warming. 
For the purposes of this study, Swcdcn hcst represents the egalitarian-dominant culture; 
the United States best exemplifies market-dominant culture, and Japan is the most appro- 
priate example of a culture dominated by hierarchical elements. 
To test the theory, the following five questions are asked: 
1) what does the theory predict ahoi~t how coi~ntries will view their role in a global 
commons problem'? 
2) what docs tlie theory prcdicl ahoul Llic nature of the policy-making process within 
each society? 
3) what does the theory predicl about each country's likely choice of policy instruments? 
4) what does the theory predicl aboul the speed of policy-making and implementation? 
5 )  what does tlie theory predict about how countries will view the role of technology in 
solving environmental problc~ns'? And if there is a role, where does the drive to 
innovate originate? 
The paper then describes the devclopmcnt of global climate change policies in each 
of the three countries, including a discussion of the motivations that led each country to 
act on the issue. Finally, i t  analyzes to what extent actual events in the three countries 
corresponded to the theory's predictions. 
The theory was strongest in predicting tlie nature of the policy making process and 
weakest in predicting the choice ol' policy instruments. In spite of its limitations, cultural 
theory suggests tlie importance of cultural inlluences in the policy making process. Be- 
cause it helps us to understand llow different types of societies arrive at decisions regard 
ing matters of international concern, moreover, the theory could prove extremely useful 
to those involved in developing international agreements, enabling them to formulate an 
agreement which is compatible with various types of societies. 
- vii - 
I. Introduction 
By the time they signed the Framework Convention on Global Climate Change in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, most of the world's industrialized countries had declared, and many had 
taken some unilateral measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This "pre-regime" 
implementation on the domestic level had a significant influence on the development of the final 
agreement, determining to some extent its contents, and it is now shaping expectations as the first 
protocol to the agreement is negotiated. 
Despite consensus by the developed countries on the need to mitigate the problem of global 
warming, each country approached the greenhouse gas (GHG) problem very differently at home. 
These differences in framing the problem and devising and implementing GHG reduction strate- 
gies and in distributing the burdens of emissions fairly are attributable to a variety of factors, 
including a difference in political culture. The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence 
of political culture on the development of climate change policy in three countries. 
In the context of policy making, national culture refers to the framework used by citizens of a 
given country to impose order on events. A recognized model of institutional decision-making, 
called cultural theory, identifies three cultural elements that combine and compete to give each 
society its distinctive political character. These are the hierarchical, the individualist/market- 
oriented, and the egalitarian-collectivist (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).' The interaction of these 
three cultural types within a given setting shapes the debate on major social issues and influences 
their outcomes. While every society contains elements of all three cultural types, one usually 
predominates. At issue is the question of how arguments must be framed within a given cultural 
group if the arguments are to be credible to the group. 
In the egalitarian/collectivist culture, decision-making occurs at the group level and is based 
on consensus among group members. Emphasis is on the group acting as a whole (Schwarz and 
Thompson 1990). Contrary to the hierarchical system, which relies heavily on rules and proce- 
dures in decision-making, or the market system, which puts a premium on decision-maker skill 
' Some cultural theorists describe four cultural types, the fourth being the the so-called "residual" type, 
which consists of actors on the margins of world events. These groups, lacking resources for future invest- 
ment or to change their current impoverished status, focus attention on meeting their immediate needs and 
thus are not able to concern themselves extensively with larger global issues (Rayner 1984). In the interna- 
tional arena, residual nations would include the poorer nations of Africa and Asia. Because these countries 
have had little experience in implementing global warming policies, however, this cultural type is not ana- 
lyzed in this study. 
and particular argument and its ability to bring members to agree upon it, decision-making within 
the egalitarian system is baed on the strength of the logic of a particular argument and its ability 
to bring members to agree upon it. This type of culture is also future-oriented and shows great 
concern for the welfare of future generations. It is also generally risk-averse; risks which do exist 
should be spread evenly across the entire society. Sweden, with its decentralized political struc- 
ture and long traditions of social welfare, social pluralism, and community-based decision-making, 
exemplifies the egalitarian/collectivist culture. 
In the individualist/market-based institutional culture, the emphasis is on maximizing benefits 
to the individual, and market principles often constitute the basis for policy decisions. Discretion 
in decision-making rests with individuals and firms through the use of market mechanisms. In 
devising policy, market cultures generally reject regulation and take a positive attitude toward 
risk. Indeed, risk is seen as a necessary element of success. These competitive pressures give 
rise to the short-term focus that is characteristic of market cultures. It is important to note that, 
with respect to cultural theory, the definition of a market culture is not limited to a method of 
doing business involving the exchange of goods and services. Rather, the market culture embrac- 
es an entire system of decision-making, in which individuals must often fend for themselves be- 
cause group solidarity is weak. Because of its traditional preference for market mechanisms and 
emphasis on individual freedom and rights, the United States is a good example of this type of 
iilstitutional culture. 
The hierarchy-dominant system is characterized by a great degree of centralization, with deci- 
sion-making responsibility often lying within a particular office. The system takes a conservative 
approach to risk and favors decisions that promote stability. Its emphasis is on control and system 
maintenance over the long term, and in contrast to market cultures, where the concept of time has 
a very short-term focus, hierarchies have long institutional memories and aim to preserve the 
status quo. The hierarchy-dominant system is further characterized by its preferences for adminis- 
trative procedure; problems are reduced to routine whenever possible, and resources are allocated 
based on technocratic assessment of needs (Rayner 1991). Japan, with its centralized national 
decision-making structure, its emphasis on managerialism, and its traditionally future-oriented, 
long-term approach to policy-making, is an example of this type of culture. 
Viewing climate change policy through the lens of cultural theory may make it possible for us 
to better understand the process of policy implementation within a given country as well as the 
country's choice of policies to reduce the threat of global warming. Unlike the traditional politi- 
cal economy approach to comparing countries' policy choices, cultural theory recognizes that 
there are cultural constraints on how a society may respond to challenges it faces. For example, 
in the past, political scientists, using the comparative political economy approach, have compared 
the policy making environments of the United States and European countries, namely Sweden, 
Britain, France, and West Germany.' These studies have attempted to explain why U.S. regula- 
tions, which are often stricter than those of other countries, are not necessarily more effective. 
They conclude that the U.S. system of government, consisting of equally strong executive, legisla- 
tive, and judicial branches and which encourages public participation in the rule-making process, 
fosters discord among the competing interest groups, thereby hampering policymakers' ability to 
develop effective, implementable policies. Each of the studies offers recommendations for how 
the U.S. could enhance its regulatory effectiveness by emulating the other countries' approaches. 
While the recommendations may be sound, it is clear that in the decade or so since those works 
have been published, little has actually changed in the U.S.--the same weaknesses still appear. 
This is because the organizational behavior and policy making processes within one society are not 
readily translatable to another, owing to differences in culture, history, national values, and a host 
of other factors. Thus, in order for policies to be effective within a given country, they must take 
into consideration the unique political and social context of the nation where they will be imple- 
mented. Cultural theory may therefore be a useful tool for projecting the success of various 
policy instruments within a given country and for identifying the major decision-making groups in 
each country. 
Traditional political economy studies argue that the reason the U.S. society does not always 
achieve desired results is because of an ineffective political system. In contrast to those types of 
studies, this paper does not attempt to prove that the U.S.'--or any given country's--political 
system does not work, but rather demonstrates how differences in culture can affect political out- 
comes. A parsimonious theory is applied and evidence is cited to show that countries' decisions 
and policy actions are driven by their domestic cultures and are very difficult to change. Thus, 
political economy studies, downplaying cultural aspects, may be based on insufficient assump- 
tions. 
This paper will compare the design and implementation of greenhouse gas reduction strategies 
in three countries--the U.S.,  Sweden, and Japan--prior to the signing of the Framework Conven- 
tion on Climate Change of 1992. The purpose of the paper is to test whether cultural theory can 
in fact project differences in national approaches to policy implementation. If its projections are 
correct, then the theory may be useful in formulating international agreements and in forecasting 
' See David Vogel, 1986. National Sryles of Regulation; Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas 
Ilgen, 1985. Controlling Chenzicals: the Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States; and Steven 
Kelman. 198 I .  Regulating America, Regulating Sweden. 
future national actions, because it will enable negotiators to develop a final agreement that is 
compatible with different cultural types. 
While various studies have been conducted on national approaches to the climate change prob- 
lem, most are purely descriptive and do not satisfactorily explain why countries' approaches dif- 
fer. These works focus mostly on the economic and political considerations that shape the global 
warming policy debate.3 This paper builds on those important studies, but goes one step further 
in offering an explanation of how social and cultural values influence the countries' decision-mak- 
ing processes and help determine outcomes. 
It is important to note that cultural theory as it was originally conceived was intended to ex- 
plain the behavior of individuals in smaller social groups, as opposed to countries. However, this 
paper applies the theory on a national scale to ascertain whether its projections at the highly ag- 
gregated level of the nation-state are valid. When it comes to the greenhouse gas issue, decisions, 
though ultin~ately made at the micro level (firms and households) are reflected at the national 
level. Similarly, international agreements are negotiated and contain obligations between national 
governments. Thus national level aggregation is appropriate for this type of study. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first establishes a series of five tests for cultural 
theory. The second one describes the climate change policies implemented in Sweden, the U.S. 
and Japan prior to their signing the Rio Convention. The third section of the paper analyzes 
whether or not cultural theory is a useful tool in projecting national behavior, based on the tests 
outlined in the first section. In the fourth section, the paper's conclusions are synthesized. 
11. Predictions of Cultural Theory 
Can cultural theory accurately predict how countries will respond to international policy 
issues? The theory will be tested using five questions: 
1. what does the theory predict about how countries will view their role in a global com- 
mons problem? 
2. what does the theory predict about the nature of the policy-making process within each 
society? 
3. what does the theory predict about the country's likely choice of policy instruments? 
See Michael Grubb et al, 1991. Energy Policies and the Greenhouse Effect, vols. I&II; Steinar 
Andresen, 1993. " U.S. Climate Policy: Ideology vs. Pragmatism; " Gunnar Fermann. 1992. "Japan in the 
Greenhouse. " 
4. what does the theory predict about the speed of the policy-making and implementation 
process? 
5. what does the theory predict about how countries will view the role of technology in 
solving environnlental problems? And if there is a role, where does the drive to innovate 
originate? 
Global Cornnzons Problem. The essence of the global commons problem is that the 
world's resources are limited and shared, and that each country will want to maximize its portion 
of the wealth. Consequently, each nation has an incentive to let other countries bear the burden 
of global environmental protection (in this case, greenhouse gas abatement measures). The ques- 
tion is, how does each cultural type view its role in managing the commons, and what is the 
responsibility of an individual country to cooperate on global issues when there is no higher au- 
thority to allocate rights, absent a consensus of the governed? Cultural theory suggests that egali- 
tarian cultures, with their future-oriented, intergenerational focus, would believe that further deg- 
radation of the environment must be prevented so that succeeding generations can thrive. This 
type of society will believe that the world's resources should be evenly distributed, and all societ- 
ies will bear equal responsibility for maintaining the commons. The egalitarian society will there- 
fore take an aggressive approach to dealing with environmental problems and will be eager to act 
on a global level to preserve common resources. 
Market cultures, on the other hand, will hold that resources should be allocated on a first 
come, first served basis: those who first gain access to common resources will have the right to 
control them; relative prices will determine subsequent consumption patterns. Market cultures 
also believe that global systems are resilient; they will only act on a commons problem if it is in 
their best economic interest to do so. If the costs of action outweigh the benefits, a market cul- 
ture will not change its behavior. A market society tends to be oriented toward the short-term. 
This is because market thinking yields interest and discount rates, concepts which favor the near- 
term over the future. Owing to this overall short-term focus, therefore, market societies are less 
concerned with the welfare of future generations. For these reasons, such cultures will be less in- 
clined than egalitarian~ to respond cooperatively on global issues. 
Because hierarchies believe that those who can most afford to take action should do so, 
they will address the commons problem as long as the overall system is maintained. Usually they 
will be slow to respond to the threat. However, once the decision to act has been made, the 
hierarchy will allocate resources to combat the problem based on the bureaucracy's appraisal of 
needs. The response will be centralized, technocratic, and cautious. 
The Policy-Making and  Implementation Process. Cultural theory suggests that in an egal- 
itarian-dominant system, the policy-making process will involve considerable debate among a wide 
range of actors as the society struggles to obtain the consensus necessary to support a course of 
action. Though in egalitarian cultures social cohesion is generally high compared to market cul- 
tures, there could still be wide disagreement regarding the seriousness of the problem and the type 
of solution required to confront it. The policy making process will tend toward fractiousness, but 
since this type of society values solidarity and cooperation, different points of view will eventually 
converge through compromise. 
In a market culture, emphasis is on maximizing benefits to the individual. Because there 
is less value placed on the welfare of the overall society, as in the case of an egalitarian/collect- 
ivist culture, like-minded groups compete with each other and are much less willing to compro- 
mise on issues of national concern. Marketplace mentality extends to policymaking--different 
interests compete; the currency is political power. The policy-making process is open to all and 
will therefore be contentious and discordant. 
In a hierarchy-driven society, the process lacks the complexity of the other two societies 
because it is driven by major actors in a top-down, streamlined fashion. Once a powerful faction 
decides on a course of action, policy measures can be quickly implemented. While the hierarchi- 
cal society values the presentation of sound scientific arguments, it generally does not encourage 
stakeholder groups to join in a national debate on major issues, which simplifies the process. 
Choice of Policy It~str~irnents. In an egalitarian-dominant society one would expect to find 
a combination of information and regulation as the primary policy instruments. Information activ- 
ities can include advertising or educational campaigns, training programs, media coverage of gov- 
ernment activities, and persuasion of key decision-makers, to name a few. The goal is to bring 
about the consensus that is so integral to egalitarian societies and to influence the behavior of 
individuals to correspond with larger social objectives. Governments sometimes use information 
about companies to expose them if they do not comply with laws and regulations. This type of 
pressure often brings recalcitrant firms into compliance with government objectives (US DOE 
1989). Regulation is used to keep polluters in check, and it is significant that in an egalitarian 
culture the emphasis is on the uniform application of regulations, since the exercise of discretion 
by either the regulators or the regulated would violate principles of strict equality (Rayner 1991). 
Hence, when an egalitarian culture imposes regulations, these will be applied in such a way as to 
level the playing field so that all members of the society have the same opportunities. 
In a market-oriented society one would expect market mechanisms, such as tradeable 
permits and price incentives, to be the primary policy instruments. These measures leave the 
decision of whether and how much to pay for a cleanlsafe environment, to the discretion of indi- 
vidual firms and consumers. Market cultures will also favor research and development, since this 
is compatible with the society's drive to innovate. 
Hierarchies may be expected to favor a combination of command measures and fiscal 
incentives. Because of their preferences for order, procedure, and control, they will be inclined 
toward regulation. However, these societies are often sympathetic to the concerns of the organi- 
zations and individuals they must oversee, so they will also support the use of fiscal incentives, 
which leave some implementation decisions to the discretion of the individual firms. Thus, appli- 
cation of restrictions will not be uniform, but instead will be distributed unevenly throughout the 
society (Rayner 1991). 
Speed of Policy-Making and Irnplernentation Process. Cultural theory also implies certain 
projections about the speed with which countries are able to implement policies once the decision 
to act has been made. From an egalitarian society, assuming that the required consensus already 
exists, one would expect implementation to be quick. Because there is agreement regarding the 
appropriate course of action relative to the problem, all actors can be expected to work together to 
ensure successful execution of the agreed-upon regimen. This is a strong contrast to the situation 
in a market-oriented society, where the contentious policy-making process extends to implemen- 
tation. Thus, implementation would be very slow, even after policy has been decided upon. This 
is because those who disagree with a final policy choice are likely to challenge it, e.g., through 
time-consuming, adversarial legal proceedings. Much time is required to conduct the studies nec- 
essary to support the views of interested parties and to allow all groups to have their views heard. 
Such a system often leads to gridlock, and hence to actions that further postpone decisions. As a 
result, the final policies of market cultures lack teeth and are often viewed by the other countries 
as weak and ineffectual. Typically, in a hierarchical culture, a "top-down" orientation means that 
inlplementation is swift, because the powerful organization at the head has great authority to push 
through the desired policy measures. Resources can be quickly mobilized to serve the cause. In 
such a culture there is little tolerance for dissent or debate. 
The Role of Technology. Cultural theory may also be able to explain the attitudes coun- 
tries take toward technological innovation. Because egalitarian cultures view nature as fragile and 
endangered, cultural theory projects that these types of societies will not rely heavily on techno- 
logical solutions in managing global problems. However, when they do apply technologies, they 
will prefer small-scale technologies that can be controlled in a decentralized way, since egalitari- 
ans reject centralization of power (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). Market cultures, by contrast, 
will rely heavily on technology to solve environmental problems and reduce uncertainty regarding 
the seriousness of any potential threats. These cultures view innovation as an important key to 
success. In this type of society, innovation will be driven by the free market; individual firms 
will have discretion to determine which technologies will most efficiently mitigate environmental 
problems. 
Hierarchies will likewise take a positive attitude toward technology. They look favorably 
on it as a means of reducing uncertainties, creating solutions, and generating the information by 
which government decisions will be made. However, in this type of society, innovative efforts 
will be much more centralized than in a market culture (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). Typical- 
ly, the government will be the primary sponsor of large-scale scientific research and development 
programs and will make decisions about technology investment. 
111. Global Warming Policies in Sweden, the U.S., and Japan 
Background 
Many atmospheric scientists believe that greenhouse warming, caused by emissions of so- 
called greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, may occur over the next several decades. Green- 
house gases include carbon dioxide (CO,); carbon monoxide (CO); nitrous oxide (N,O); tropo- 
spheric ozone, methane (CH,); and chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs). Carbon dioxide is the primary 
anthropogenic contributor to the greenhouse effect. Scientists predict that increasing atnlospheric 
concentrations of CO, might cause a rise in the Earth's temperature of around 3 degrees C per 
decade over the next century (IPCC 1992). Among potential consequences of global warming are 
changing patterns of precipitation, including increased frequency of severe storms, changes in 
growing seasons and vegetation patterns, greatly reduced soil moisture in agricultural areas, and 
expansion of the oceans owing to melting of the earth's glaciers. Should this occur, some species 
of plants and animals may not be able to adapt to a change in climate and would die off, disrupt- 
ing the ecosystem (IPCC 1990). Such dramatic changes in the earth's ecosystem would almost 
certainly affect the human community and have direct and indirect impacts on virtually all socio- 
economic systems. Floods and desertification could cause large-scale movement of peoples with 
unknown consequences for resource distribution and economic stability in some regions. 
To  fully understand possible impacts of climate change, more complete information re- 
garding human interaction with the natural environmental is required. Indeed, the incompleteness 
of scientific understanding is one of the most significant characteristics of the global change ques- 
tions: while scientists predict that some degree of global warming is inevitable, they remain 
uncertain how much the earth may warm, what the time frame for such warming may be, or how 
change may affect the world's economies and ecosystems. The most sophisticated general circula- 
tion models can at best only estimate the consequences of global warming. Because of these 
persistent uncertainties and the potentially high costs involved in responding to global climate 
change, many nations are reluctant to formulate policies aimed at slowing global warming. 
The following section describes how global warming policies were designed in Sweden, 
the United States and Japan. I t  focuses not only on the policies themselves, but also on the moti- 
vations that led each country both to address the climate change issue and to select the policy 
measures they did. 
Sweden 
Sweden's institutional decisionmaking culture is dominated by the collectivist/egalitarian 
cultural type, with a strong focus on the welfare of the total society. This orientation may have 
had its origins in the Middle Ages: since feudalism did not exist in Sweden, a strong hierarchical 
tradition never developed. Similarly, Sweden's early parliament, arising during Medieval times, 
consisted of four classes: the nobility, clergy, burgers, and peasants, all having equal representa- 
tion. This democratic arrangement was highly unusual for that time in Europe, and it helped give 
birth to the Swedish cooperative spirit that exists today (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1993). 
Equality and moderation are Swedish ideals; society looks askance at people who stand 
out too much from the rest of the group. The commonly-used word lagonl in Swedish expresses 
this preference for restraint and social balance. Lagom means, roughly, just the right amount--not 
too much and not too little to satisfy both one's own needs and the requirements of the larger 
society (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1993). 
Sweden is also very oriented toward consensus, accommodation, and consideration for 
others. This can be seen in the country's social policies, which guarantee generous pensions; 
access to health care; high-quality, state-supported education; maternity leave; and child care al- 
lowances. Instead of relying on private enterprise to provide these benefits, Swedes choose fi- 
nancing through taxes and employer contributions (Andrain 1994). It is noteworthy, in fact, that 
after several decades of rule by the Social Democratic party, which introduced the social programs 
described above, Swedish voters in 1991 elected a government led by Christian Democrats touting 
a more American-style system of reduced government spending and private ownership. Believing 
this type of system to be a failure, however, Swedes in 1994 voted this government out and re- 
placed it by a Social Democrat-led coalition with the expectation that this government will rein- 
state the social programs that the former conservative government had attempted to dismantle 
during its short tenure. (Interestingly, the Social Democratic party is actually cutting social 
spending to alleviate budget shortfalls.) 
Compromise is another essential element of Swedish society. Within the Swedish parlia- 
mentary system, the so-called "remiss" procedure allows government organizations, non-govern- 
mental organizations, firms, and municipalities the opportunity to review and comment on legisla- 
tion proposed in the parliament with the result that the measure can pass smoothly. Indeed, par- 
liament becomes in effect a rubber stamp for legislation that has been decided on long before 
through negotiation by interested parties (Loefstedt 1993). While the United States also allows 
stakeholder groups to debate policy issues, the Swedish system is oriented much more toward 
negotiation, compromise, and reaching an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. The tenden- 
cy is for individuals to make concessions, adjusting their views to accommodate those of the rest 
of the society, unlike in the United States, where a harmonious convergence of public and private 
interests is rare (Kelman 1981). 
Sweden had long been active on the science side of the global warming debate. On the 
domestic policy front, however, it was not until 1988 that global warming received serious consid- 
eration in the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag. Once the issue came to national attention, though, 
policy measures were soon undertaken. 
Sweden has had a long history of environmental consciousness. Environmental groups 
have been active there for nearly a century. In 1967, moreover, Sweden was the first country to 
establish an Environmental Protection Board, and in 1969 the Riksdag passed one of the most 
comprehensive pieces of environmental legislation of any nation up until that time (Loefstedt 
1993). The reason for the relatively late action on the climate change issue was not lack of public 
interest, but rather great national concern about the country's heavy reliance on nuclear energy. 
Indeed, the Swedish response to climate change must be viewed in the context of the national 
debate on nuclear power. 
As far back as the early 1970s, many Swedes had protested the country's dependence on 
nuclear power, owing to concerns about high-level radioactive waste and plant safety. The Three 
Mile Island incident in the U.S. in 1976 heightened this apprehension (Loefstedt 1993). Led by 
various environmental groups, the Swedish people decided in 1980 via a referendum to phase out 
the use of nuclear energy by the year 2010. The greenhouse issue rose to prominence in Sweden 
a few years later and received even more publicity in 1988, largely as a result of an extremely 
hot, dry summer in North America. 
Concern over the greenhouse issue was compounded by recognition of the country's 
potential vulnerability to the effects of climate change. Warmer temperatures could have serious 
implications for Sweden, particularly in the Baltic area. Rising sea level, warmer water tempera- 
tures, a reduction in the sea's salinity could make certain areas of the country uninhabitable and 
weaken important sectors of the economy. Scientists estimate that inflow of fresh water from 
Sweden to the Baltic Sea could change by the order of 20 percent, which in turn would have 
serious consequences for marine ecosystems. Sea level rise would also cause serious erosion 
along the south coast of the Baltic, and nitrogen from flooded areas along the coast could flow 
into the sea, upsetting the ecological balance, resulting in loss of species. Warmer water tempera- 
tures could change the composition of marine organisms, causing in declines in fish populations, 
which in turn would affect the Swedish fishing industry. Global warming could also affect pat- 
terns of air movement, bringing air pollution from other parts of Europe to Sweden (Swedish 
Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources 1994A). After its experience with sulphur 
dioxide in the 1970s and 80s and the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Sweden is particularly sensitive 
to the potential problems of transboundary air pollution. Thus, in contrast to the U.S. and other 
countries, the Swedish government acknowledged that the global change issue must be confronted. 
The question was, how should Sweden reduce emissions of greenhouse gases without relying more 
heavily on nuclear power, the main alternative to fossil energy? 
The Riksdag swiftly announced the national policy on climate change in 1988. The force 
behind the decision was an alliance between the Center Party and environmental groups pushing 
for renewable energy production on the one hand, and the Conservative Party and other groups 
advocating nuclear power on the other hand. Only the Social Democratic Party, which at that 
time had a minority position in the government, voted against a C 0 2  stabilization plan. The broad 
goal of the government was to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1988 levels by the year 2000. 
To accomplish this, parliament initiated a climate change strategy consisting of two major ele- 
ments: 1) a national energy strategy aimed at reducing emissions of CO,, and 2) a carbon tax 
designed to reduce demand for fossil fuels. 
The global climate change issue also marked the beginning of a new era in Swedish envi- 
ronmental policy making, in that for the first time fiscal incentives were used as the primary 
policy incentives. While ecollomic instruments had been introduced in the environmental policy 
arena in the 1970s, their use was limited, and until the late 1980s, Sweden relied mainly on com- 
mand measures for pollution abatement. The most significant such measures were the Environ- 
mental Protection Act of 1969 and the Act on Chemical Products. The former regulated emis- 
sions of harmful substances from point sources, while the latter was introduced in 1985 to control 
the emissions of chemical products and other substances posing a threat to human health and/or 
the environment (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 1991). By the late 1980s, however, emis- 
sions from smaller, diffuse sources were increasing, a trend that would require different types of 
policy measures, since regulations alone did not offer polluters sufficient incentive to reduce emis- 
sions. Economic instruments were seen as an option which could provide this incentive (Swedish 
Ministry of the Environment 199 1). 
The need to update traditional environmental policy measures and the need to overhaul 
existing tax policies motivated the government to propose a new tax on carbon dioxide in 1988. 
Many Swedes--both private citizens and industrial concerns--had argued for years that national 
income and energy taxes were too high. In addition, the business sector had long complained that 
taxes on exports put Swedish industries at a competitive disadvantage and might force Swedish 
companies to move abroad, where rates were more favorable (Bohm 1994). Tax reform was 
regarded by many as the most appropriate means of responding to these concerns. 
Because Sweden is a small country where members of parliament, industry, and NGOs 
often know each other, lobbying is done very informally through personal networks. Unlike the 
U.S.  system, where professional lobbying organizations often play a major role in networking 
between government and special interests and frequently make signficant contributions to the cam- 
paign funds of political candidates, the Swedish system is much less structured, and Swedes are 
forbidden by law to make financial donations to candidates. This informal system of networking 
is facetiously referred to as "brotherhood corruption." Both business and environmental groups 
employed it to influence the government stance on the global warming policy debate. 
Business argued that Sweden should not impose a carbon tax until other European coun- 
tries had also done so. Since nearly half of Swedish industrial production is exported to Europe, 
industry feared losing its competitive edge. One of the major participants in this debate was the 
Federation of Swedish Industries (Svenska Industriefoerbundet), an umbrella organization for man- 
ufacturing groups. This organization, along with various other industrial groups, lobbied parlia- 
ment to reject the carbon tax. 
Predictably, environmental groups took the opposite position. They lobbied parliament on 
behalf of a carbon tax and received strong support from the Center and Left parties. In a society 
which is accustomed to high levels of taxation, the notion of a carbon tax was not strongly op- 
posed by the Riksdag, especially since a majority of Swedish parliamentarians come from public 
sector, as opposed to business sector, backgrounds. In the end, the Riksdag revised the tax sys- 
tem. reducing income taxes, broadening the VAT to apply to all forms of energy, and adding CO, 
and sulphur dioxide taxes. However, as we shall see, some concessions were made to industry. 
The carbon dioxide tax, which went into effect on January 1, 1991, was applied to all 
fossil fuels except when they are used in the production of electricity. Thus about 25 percent of 
Swedish CO, emissions are exempted from taxation (OECD 1992). The carbon dioxide tax is 
calculated on the basis of both the average carbon content of the fuel and the caloric content 
(Swedish Ministry of the Environment 1991). Because of pressures from industrial groups, how- 
ever, tax burdens on industry were minimized. The 1991 tax law put a ceiling on the total 
amount of energy taxes to be paid by each company. During 1991 the ceiling was 1.7 percent of 
the value of manufactured products; between 1992 and 1994 the rate was lowered to 1.2 percent 
(OECD 1994A). As a result of these concessions, energy-intensive industries such as cement, 
pulp and paper, iron and steel, and chemicals, were protected from high taxes. Similarly, there is 
a cap of 15 percent of the combined tax on energy and CO, for commercial horticulture using 
energy to heat greenhouses (Bohm 1994). As a result of further tax reform in 1993, however, 
this loophole will be closed in 1996, when all branches of the manufacturing sector will be subject 
to uniform carbon taxation (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 1994). It is also noteworthy 
that tax rates on electricity also vary between regions in Sweden, owing to differences in regional 
policy. For example, the tax rate on non-industrial uses is lower for certain parts of northern and 
northwestern Sweden (Bohm 1994). 
The Swedish Ministry of the Environment projected that the carbon tax would reduce 
carbon emissions by 5-10 million tons by the turn of the century and would transfer approximately 
18,000 million SEK ($2.7 billion) from income tax to various types of energy and environmental 
taxes (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 1991). 
The second element of Sweden's pre-Rio climate change policy was its national energy 
strategy. In 1991 the Riksdag passed its "Interparty Agreement on Energy Policy," which called 
for increased energy conservation and "environmentally adapted energy production," i.e., energy 
production using fuel sources that have little impact on climate ~ h a n g e . ~  According to the agree- 
ment, energy conservation is to be realized through the use of energy-efficient technologies, dem- 
onstration projects in residential, commercial, and industrial premises, pilot installations, and 
advice to small and medium-sized industries on how to enhance energy efficiency. The energy 
policy also encouraged the use of renewables by offering investment grants to facilities that utilize 
renewable energy sources, such as wind power, solar energy, and bio-fuelled combined heat and 
power (CHP- cogeneration). The agreement further stated that, if fossil fuels must be used, then 
natural gas should be given preference over oil and coal, and CHP should to be given preference 
over condensing power. CHP is further exempt from energy tax on fuel (Government of Sweden 
1991). 
As part of its energy strategy, the Swedish government also launched an ambitious pro- 
gram of research and development. The 1990 Energy Research Bill had three fundamental goals: 
to establish fundamental competence and expertise; to facilitate the changeover of the country's 
energy system to allow the phase-out of nuclear power; and to establish greater awareness of the 
effects of energy systems on climate and the environment. Total funding for this program 
amounted to SEK 343.8 million ($12 million) in 1990191. The budget supported R&D on energy 
Since the signing of the Rio Framework Convention in 1992, the Swedish parliament has decided to re- 
visit its energy policy. Currently it is under review by a special energy commission, and it remains to be 
seen if any revisions will be made. 
supply (with special emphasis on renewables), energy technology in industry, transportation re- 
search, as well as 16 million ($1.8 million) for research on environment and climate (Government 
of Sweden 1991). 
Further evidence of the seriousness with which Sweden regarded the climate change issue 
is the fact that at the ministerial conference at Noordwijk in the Netherlands in 1989, Sweden was 
one of the nations arguing for protocols containing specific commitments to reduce CO, emissions. 
This stance was opposed by the United States and ultimately defeated in the final Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
TIze United States 
The United States is an example of a market/individualist decision-making culture. In this 
type of system, emphasis is placed on maximizing quality of life at the individual level, and a free 
market is believed to be the best mechanism to ensure that personal success is achieved. In addi- 
tion, market cultures believe that technology and innovation hold the answers for many of the 
problems faced by society. 
The market orientation of the United States can be traced to the country's early develop- 
ment. The U.S. had its origins in the struggle against autocratic rule in the 17th and 18th centu- 
ries; hence there was no tradition of nobility or peerage. Instead, the nation's development was 
based upon the rights of the individual, as evidenced by the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, 
which guarantees certain freedoms to all people and limits the power of the state to interfere in the 
affairs of the private citizen. What's more, the U.S. rose to prominence during the industrial 
revolution, when the primary emphasis was on industry and commerce. 
In contrast to the situation in many other nations, the individual in American society takes 
large responsibility for his own well-being and resents government attempts to restrict his freedom 
or his ability to make choices. Perhaps the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville described this 
American individualism best when he said, "In all matters concerning himself, alone he [the indi- 
vidual] remains the master; he is free and owes an account of his actions to God alone. From this 
derives the maxim that the individual is the best and only judge of his own interest and that soci- 
ety has no right to direct his behavior unless it feels harmed by him or unless i t  needs his concur- 
rence" (de Tocqueville 1835). 
The U.S. approach to health care is typical of the market culture: American citizens have 
a wide range of choices in health care coverage, though they must pay for a large share of their 
health care costs themselves, unlike in egalitarian cultures, where access to free or low cost health 
care is guaranteed to all. In addition, health care prices in the U.S. are mostly determined ac- 
cording to market principles of supply and demand. Although efforts have been underway to 
transform the system into a more egalitarian one that covers the millions of Americans currently 
not eligible for coverage under company insurance plans, citizens and organizations in the U.S. 
have offered vigorous (and so far quite successful) resistance to such change, fearing that it may 
impinge on their freedom of choice or that they personally may have to bear a larger share of the 
burden in the form of taxes. Their arguments resonate with the market-oriented public. 
The U.S. approach to the climate change issue was nearly the opposite of Sweden's. 
While Sweden did not begin to seriously discuss policy options until fairly late (1988), the U.S. 
had discussed global warming in a policy context as early as the late 1970s, when then-President 
Jimmy Carter recognized that CO, emissions could have some bearing on U.S. energy policy 
(Hecht and Tirpak 1994). And while Sweden, once confronted with the problem, moved quickly 
on the issue, the United States took a cautious approach and was slow to respond with substantive 
policy measures. This is because many elements of the society believed that aggressive climate 
change policies could upset the U.S. economic structure, forcing major changes in industrial pro- 
cesses and in American lifestyles. In addition, the contentious nature of the policy debate, in 
which many opposing views were put on the table, precluded the formulation of any drastic policy 
measures. Thus, the major policy instruments were research and, to a lesser extent, voluntary 
measures. 
Although the U.S. scientific community had discussed the phenomenon of climate change 
since the late 1950s, public interest in the issue didn't develop until the 1980s, when a series of 
weather phenomena, including severe droughts in Africa, Asia, and especially North America, 
brought the issue to national attention. In addition, scientists in 1985 attributed a hole in the 
ozone layer over Antarctica to anthropogenic sources, suggesting to many people the impact of 
human activities on the global environment. 1988 was the crucial year for climate change as a 
serious policy issue. A severe drought that summer devastated crops in the Midwest and caused 
many people to consider the possibility that global warming may in fact be a real phenomenon; 
policy makers began to devote more attention to the issue. 
The U.S. policy-making process is characterized by its transparency. The system allows 
interested parties to make their views known on important policy questions. The debate on cli- 
mate change saw a great deal of stakeholder activity. In 1989 there were 40  days of Congression- 
al hearings on the subject of global warming (Dickson 1994). Testimony was heard from scien- 
tific experts, government officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and industry groups. 
No discussion of the U.S. decision-making system is complete without mention of the 
powerful role played by industry lobbies and other pressure groups. Nearly every industry and 
special interest in the United States is backed by a trade association or foundation with an office in 
Washington that can exert a great deal of influence on the policy-making process. These groups, 
well-financed by their members, are highly specialized and usually have strong contacts within 
Congress and/or the Executive Branch. This inside connection helps ensure that their views will 
be heard when important policy issues come up for discussion on Capitol Hill. A primary strate- 
gy of these organizations is to make donations to the campaign funds of elected officials, thereby 
putting the candidate under tacit obligation to give special consideration to that group's interest. 
In 1990, for example, political action committees (PACs) contributed over $108.5 million to the 
coffers of U.S. legislators (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Not only do special interest 
groups have access to Congress, but they can also delay the policy making process by demanding 
further hearings and threatening litigation. 
With respect to the global warming issue, industry and its supporters opposed policy mea- 
sures, such as new regulations and CO, taxes, that they felt could reduce profit margins. During 
the late 1980s, such groups lobbied Congress to reject radical measures that could weaken the 
competitiveness of U.S. industry. They also initiated information campaigns to influence media 
and public opinion, arguing that predictions of climate change were exaggerated. As policy mea- 
sures they tended to favor such non-controversial options as research and tree-planting (Dickson 
1994). President George Bush adopted a similarly noncommittal approach to the climate change 
issue, supporting industry's claim that stringent emissions reductions action would harm the com- 
petitiveness of U.S. firms and put Americans out of work (Newton 1993). 
Environmental groups, on the other hand, were for the most part critical of the U.S. 
inertia on the global warming problem and argued that more aggressive strategies and commit- 
ments were in order. In addition to advocating reduced deforestation, these organizations also 
supported increased energy efficiency and greater reliance on renewable energy sources. Many of 
the U.S. NGOs employed competent scientists who were able to conduct their own calculations of 
the climate change; they also developed policy recommendations that they offered to Congress. In 
addition, these groups worked diligently to promote public awareness of the global warming issue. 
The U.S. natural and social science community also played a major role in influencing 
policy decisions. Using sophisticated computer models, scientists contributed to the policy debate 
by attempting to project the actual likelihood of global warming and its potential economic im- 
pacts. The most famous testimony was given by Dr. James Hansen of NASA before the Senate 
Energy Committee in June of 1988. At the time of his appearance, temperatures across a large 
part of the United States were nearly 100 degrees F, and a major drought was sweeping the agri- 
cultural states of the Midwest. Hansen declared that he was "99 percent confident" that global 
warming was related to the greenhouse effect (Newton 1993). Taking the opposite view was the 
Marshall Institute, a Washington think tank, which issued a report in 1990 indicating that policy 
responses to climate change were unjustified on the grounds that computer models are inaccurate. 
The Institute further claimed that improved computer modeling would make it possible to provide 
answers to any climate threats within five years (George C.  Marshall Institute 1990). 
A similar polarization occurred among economists studying the results of detailed eco- 
nomic models, which were also a cornerstone of the U.S. global change debate. "Adaptationists" 
argued that society could adapt to changing environmental conditions through new technologies 
and other social advances. William Nordhaus, one of the main proponents of this view, conclud- 
ed through his computer models that climate change caused by increased levels of CO, would 
have only a minor impact on the U.S. economy--about one-fourth of one percent of national in- 
come--ergo, dramatic CO, reduction strategies could prove unnecessarily costly. According to 
Nordhaus, "climate change is likely to produce a combination of gains and losses with no strong 
presumption of substantial net economic losses" (Nordhaus 1991). 
"Mitigationists," on the other hand, argued that the threat of global warming was very 
serious indeed and that it would be necessary to take steps to reduce the emissions of greenhouse 
gases, since the risk of global warming is much greater than the costs required to control CO, 
en~issions. Prominent proponents of the mitigationist viewpoint included William Cline of the 
Institute for Energy Economics and Irving Mintzer of the University of Maryland (Morisette 
1992). 
Government agencies also participated in the global warming debate, adding their perspec- 
tives to the already fractious policy-making process. During the Bush Administration, which was 
in power when the climate change issue reached its peak just before the Rio Convention, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the leadership of William K.  Reilly, argued on 
behalf of aggressive CO, reduction strategies. Some representatives of the Executive branch, in- 
cluding President Bush, members of his staff, and officials from the Office of Management and 
Budget, on the other hand, took the view that there was insufficient evidence on the reality climate 
change to warrant imposition of any drastic new GHG reduction policies. This debate often 
turned ugly, with members of the Administration publicly sniping at one another (Andresen 1993). 
One important outcome of the interagency disagreement, however, was the U.S. support 
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international panel of experts ap- 
pointed to conduct a scientific assessment of the climate change issue. Representatives of various 
federal agencies in the U.S., including the State Department and the EPA, argued on behalf of an 
For a more detailed discussion of the U.S. economics-based approach to global warming, see William 
R. Cline. 1992. The Econotnics of Global Warming. 
international convention on climate change and regarded an international scientific assessment as a 
necessary precursor to such an agreement. Meanwhile, officials from other agencies viewed an 
assessment as a way to buy time, thereby avoiding the creation of policy measures against the 
uncertainty of climate change. In the end both sides supported the creation of the IPCC--though 
for very different reasons (Hecht and Tirpak 1994). 
The market-based orientation of U.S. society is also apparent in the way in which the 
climate change debate was framed. Whereas in the Swedish case, the global warming issue was 
set in the context of a national debate around nuclear power and its safety risks for the entire 
society, the global warming discussion in the U.S. was viewed in heavily economic terms. As 
mentioned above, much of the global warming discussion in the United States revolved around the 
use of econometric models to ascertain the potential costs of reducing greenhouse warming. The 
cost-benefit ("top-down") approach is common in the U.S. when it comes to making important 
social decisions. Policies must be justified by a detailed assessment of any potential impacts on 
the economy and on how the proposed new measure will be valued by citizens before govern- 
ments will coinmit to it. Implicit in the cost-benefit strategy is the assumption that costs and 
benefits are valued according to how the affected individuals would value them (Bayer 1994). 
This individualistic focus on economic indicators over energy demand contrasts sharply to the 
modeling emphases in other countries, particularly those in Germany and Sweden, where most 
government-supported models are based on the technology-oriented "bottom-up" approach. The 
bottom-up approach focuses most heavily on the technological aspects of attaining strict CO, 
reduction targets with less attention to the costs; net losses to GDP do not figure in nearly as 
prominently in those countries as they do in the U.S. 
Not only did the debate in the U.S. focus on the economic aspects of climate change, but 
it also was influenced heavily by powerful interests--such as the oil and gas lobbies--which stood 
to lose from changes in existing policy. While some non-governmental organizations tried to call 
attention to the negative impacts climate change could have on the powerless, the U.S. policy 
debate virtually ignored a serious discussion of social risk. 
Owing to this reluctance to implement forceful GHG reduction strategies having economic 
impacts, the U.S. adopted a "no regrets" approach to global warming. The no regrets approach 
was based on the argument that too little was known about the global warming problem to warrant 
significant CO, reductions, but that some non-controversial actions, such as planting trees and 
enhancing energy efficiency, should nonetheless be undertaken so that, regardless of whether or 
not global warming proved to be a reality, no one would regret having taken those actions (Andr- 
esen 1993; Reinstein 1993). This approach was criticized by other countries on the grounds that 
it represented a time-buying tactic through which the U.S. could put off indefinitely taking poten- 
tially painful measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
U.S. policy makers also took the view that greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced 
through development and transfer of environmental technologies and more efficient use of energy 
(Hecht and Tirpak 1994). Research and development were the U.S.' primary policy instruments 
in its greenhouse gas abatement strategy. Research would be conducted both on technological 
solutions to CO, emissions and on the phenomena of global warming itself. Between 1989 and 
1990 alone, Congress increased funding for focused climate change research by 43 percent 
(USGCRP 1989).6 By 1992 total U.S. expenditures for global change research amounted to $1.18 
billion (USGCRP 1992). 
In 1993, President Clinton reinforced U.S. emphasis on technological solutions in the 
introduction to his Climate Change Action Plan: "This [commitment to reducing CO, emissions] 
must be a clarion call, not for more bureaucracy or regulation or unnecessary costs, but instead 
for American ingenuity and creativity to produce the best and most energy-efficient technology" 
(Clinton and Gore 1993). Central to this Plan has been cooperation between government and 
industry to stimulate technology development in the private sector. The Plan contains over 50 
government-industry actions designed to reduce emissions of CO,. 
U.S. refusal to implement strong policy measures at home was accompanied by its refusal 
to commit to such policies internationally as well. At a conference in Toronto in June of 1988, a 
bloc of smaller countries called for a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 20% of 1988 levels 
by 2005. However, the United States, along with the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, blocked 
this proposed measure, since together these four countries accounted for nearly one-half of all 
CO, emissions, and it was felt that such a stringent commitment would harm their economies. 
The next year at the ministerial conference in Noordwijk in the Netherlands, the U.S. again re- 
fused to adopt targets and timetables for reducing CO, emissions. Thus, although awareness of 
the global warming problem was high in the U.S., substantive policy actions were slow to materi- 
alize. 
In 1990 Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), an update of the 1970 
Clean Air Act. Though not specifically designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, certain 
provisions of the CAAA would nonetheless have the result of lowering emissions. The Act intro- 
duced regulations to limit air pollution from power plants, vehicles, and industry and to reduce 
Focused research is research conducted specifically on the the issue of climate change. This figure 
does not include funding for "contributing research," or research having the potential to contribute to cli- 
mate change research but not designed expressly for that purpose. 
emission of greenhouse gases and their precursors, such as volatile organic chemicals, sulphur 
dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. The debate on this bill was marked by hundreds of hours of debate 
on Capitol Hill as consumers, utilities, and industry described to Congress how the new law 
would affect them. Steelmakers, for example, complained that certain provisions of the CAAA 
eliminating virtually all emissions from coke ovens by 2020 would cost the industry about $5 
billion. Such a requirement, they argued, could result in the loss of thousands of jobs. Likewise, 
major Midwestern utilities con~plained that the revised Clean Air Act would force them to raise 
rates for electricity (Wald 1990). Again, much of the debate was framed in terms of potential 
economic losses to sectoral interests. 
Congress also passed a new energy policy in 1992. It too contained some provisions de- 
signed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, though like the CAAA, emissions reductions were not 
the primary focus of the legislation. This energy policy was codified in the 1992 Energy Policy 
Act (EPACT), which was the legislative component of President Bush's National Energy Strategy 
of 1991 .7  The Act called for increased energy efficiency and energy conservation. It further en- 
couraged the development and commercialization of renewable energy technologies. In terms of 
specific policy instruments, EPACT consisted of the "carrot" rather than the "stick" approach. It 
introduced few new regulations and provided no penalties for breaking the law, calling instead for 
tax credits, tax relief, subsidies, and increased research and development (Eikeland 1993). For 
example, EPACT provided tax credits for electricity produced by wind and biomass facilities; it 
extended the tax credit qualifying periods on non-conventional fuels, including synfuels from coal 
and gas from biomass; and it authorized a major demonstration program aimed at accelerating 
colnrnercial application of renewable energy technologies (OECD 1993). EPACT further required 
the Secretary of Energy to establish a national inventory of greenhouse gases and to oversee the 
voluntary reporting of greenhouse gas emissions of industry. In addition, the Act also called for 
the establishment of a global climate change response fund, the purpose of which would be to 
facilitate U.S. contributions to international global change mitigation efforts (Eikeland 1993). 
When it came time to negotiate the Rio Framework Agreement on Climate Change, the 
U.S. insisted that the Convention be modified to remove timetables and targets because of con- 
cerns regarding industrial competitiveness. In addition, the U.S. succeeded in getting the "com- 
prehensive approach" included in the agreement. The comprehensive approach gives credit and 
' Though EPACT was passed in November 1992, after the Rio summit, negotiations on its content began 
long before. It can therefore be considered among the "pre-Rio" policy initiatives. 
respoilsibility for reductions of all greenhouse gases--not just C0,--so that the U.S.' phase-out of 
chlorofluorocarbons as part of the Montreal Protocol would also be considered. 
Japan 
Japanese society is dominated primarily by hierarchical elements. The country has a long 
tradition of top-down organization dating back to over a thousand years ago, when Japan was 
ruled by feudal lords who controlled the peasants and owed allegiance to the Emperor. Even 
during these times, Japan had a very sophisticated system of bureaucracy and public administra- 
tion which enabled rulers to control their lands and collect tax revenues. The hierarchical struc- 
ture of the society can still be seen today in the deferent attitudes of the people toward authority 
and by the fact that it is customary to defer to person of greater age or of higher social position. 
This rigid social structure is even reflected in the language, which makes distinctions in the social 
standing of the person speaking in relation to the person addressed (Hampden-Turner and Trompe- 
naars 1993). 
Many experts on the Japanese policymaking system concur that Japan is dominated by an 
elitist triumvirate consisting of the professional bureaucracy, the leading political party (until re- 
cently the Liberal Democratic Party), and leaders of big business. These three groups share the 
same social, economic, and educational, and ideological backgrounds and are usually united in 
goals and action. Because of these similarities, moreover, there is much interaction among the 
three groups, and they are able to control the decision-making process to the exclusion of outside 
individuals and groups, though outsiders are often allowed to participate in largely symbolic roles 
(Peterson and Wade 1985). Because of this closed, top-down system of governance, policy 
makers in Japan generally wield greater power than do their counterparts in other countries, in- 
cluding the U.S. and Sweden. 
There is a seeming paradox in that, while Japan has a very hierarchical power structure, 
the Japanese pride themselves on the egalitarian nature of their society, which emphasizes the im- 
portance of national consent in addressing major social issues. While it is true that agreement on 
many aspects of public behavior is the norm, this consensus often derives from social pressure to 
conform. The Japanese disparage strongly individualistic behavior, and people are expected to 
adapt their attitudes and behaviors to those of the larger society. The government often plays a 
role in shaping public opinion. Thus, egalitarian tendencies are influenced to a large extent by 
hierarchical elements. 
The Japanese research system is characteristic of a hierarchy. It is based on centralized 
R&D guidelines, which are put forth every few years by the Japanese Council for Science and 
Technology, consisting of the Prime Minister and ten other members. This body articulates an 
overarching science and technology policy, spelled out in The General Guidelirles for Science and 
Teclznology. This document establishes the basic principles to which all government agencies 
must adhere in developing their individual R&D programs. The various ministries and agencies 
have some latitude in implementing the policy, but they are still required to meet the objectives of 
the national plan (Anderson 1991). This system contrasts to that of, for example, the United 
States, which has fourteen individual Departments as well as several mission agencies, each hav- 
ing its own internally-developed research agenda and budget. While the U.S. research enterprise 
has begun to resemble Japan's in recent years with the creation of the National Science and Tech- 
nology Council, the U.S. system is much less centralized than Japan's in terms policy develop- 
ment. 
We have seen that Sweden undertook aggressive measures at home to combat the threat of 
climate change, and that the U.S.,  while becoming aware of the problem early on and devoting 
substantial public attention and financial resources to it, nonetheless took a conservative approach 
to implementing climate change policies. Like Sweden, Japan was late in picking up on the policy 
side of the climate change issue at home, and like the United States, its response was cautious. 
Japan has the second largest economy in the world, and it is the fourth-largest consumer 
of energy. Although it is one of the most energy-efficient countries in the world, its production 
of greenhouse gases is still high at 2.97 million metric tons of CO, in 1991 (Marland et a1 1994). 
In spite of a high level of CO, emissions, climate change did not receive much attention in Japan 
until the late 1980s. There were two reasons for this lack of action. The first was that there was 
no one behind the issue to push it to the forefront of the national agenda; neither government, 
NGOs, nor the scientific community devoted much attention to climate change until shortly before 
the Convention was signed in 1992. The second reason was that Japan was hesitant to act alone 
on the climate change issue. 
The environmental movement in Japan is particularly weak, for a variety of reasons. 
There are few environmental organizations, and those that do  exist concern themselves primarily 
with local and regional problems rather than with global issues. For example, Japan's small envi- 
ronmental movement focuses mainly on the risks associated with nuclear power, and since the 
1970s these groups have led opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants near major 
cities. The problems of nuclear waste management are much more immediate to the Japanese 
than the more abstract notion of global warming. As in the case of Sweden, this attitude posed a 
dilemma for those who would take up the cause of global warming, since by opposing nuclear 
power, environmental groups would thus also be opposing one of the primary means to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Because the Japanese policy-making process is so closed, more- 
over, it is difficult for stakeholder groups to have much influence on politicians, although there do 
exist some advisory committees that provide input on policy decisions to the government 
(Fermann 1992). 
Like the environmental groups, the Japanese scientific community has tended to concen- 
trate most of its resources on ground level air pollution and has traditionally not involved itself 
much with global issues, although some climate change research was conducted on a small scale at 
various Japanese research institutions. Government agencies were similarly detached from the 
global warming problem. An Environment Agency does exist in Japan, but this body was caught 
up in dealing with a rapidly growing caseload of domestic pollution problems and was unable to 
devote much attention to global issues during the years when climate change was emerging as a 
major international issue (Schreurs 1994). The Japanese Environment Agency, established only in 
the early 1970s, was also quite weak in comparison with other government bodies, such as the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and other ministries. 
The second reason for Japanese inaction on the climate change issue was that the govern- 
ment believed that Japan had already made a significant contribution to reducing global CO, emis- 
sions, since its energy efficiency level was already very high compared to other nations. By tak- 
ing strong unilateral measures on the climate change issue, therefore, critics argued that Japan 
would be at a disadvantage relative to other countries. Consequently, the government postulated 
that Japanese action in the greenhouse issue would have to take place in the context of internation- 
al activity. Policy makers argued that countries with the highest CO, emissions levels (e.g., the 
United States) should bear the greatest burdens for reduction. Only in such a way would respon- 
sibility for solving global problems be managed fairly (interview with C.  Watanabe). 
A change occurred around 1988, mainly as a result of international pressures. Japanese 
leaders had long been sensitive to criticism from abroad that Japan aggressively pursued its own 
interests--primarily economic--while neglecting its international responsibilities (Weidner 1993). 
Govermment representatives were thus eager to promote a new image of the country as a world 
leader in the area of environmental protection. Japan's bureaucracies, once realizing that global 
warming was fast becoming a highly visible policy issue, moved quickly to establish global envi- 
roiunental offices through which they could influence policy (Schreurs 1994). 
In spite of an upgrade in status for climate change, efforts by the Environment Agency to 
introduce policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions were initially hindered by MITI's and 
industry executives' concern that policy actions to reduce carbon emissions might hamper econom- 
ic growth and competitiveness. Japan's fears in this regard echoed those of the U.S. and Swedish 
business communities. A political battle ensued between MITI and the Environment Agency. 
NIITI advocated energy conservation, transfer of energy technology, and R&D on new technolo- 
gies, while the Environment Agency argued on behalf of international cooperation and CO, reduc- 
tion targets. 
Because of MITI's dominance of the debate, Japan at first resisted international pressures 
to sign onto an international climate change agreement, and along with the United States and a 
handful of other industrialized countries, opposed the establishment of a world climate fund which 
was proposed in May of 1989. At the 1989 Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and 
Climatic Change, Japan and its allies (including the U.S.) refused immediate policy action and in- 
stead proposed that more research be conducted. 
Finally, after months of negotiations between MITI and the Environment Agency, Japan 
announced a plan to stabilize per capita carbon dioxide emissions by 2000. This was done in June 
of 1990 at the Second World Climate Congress in Geneva. The Action Plan to Address Global 
Warrning represented the basis for Japanese global warming policy and outlined a series of actions 
to be taken by the government and private sector in order to achieve desired CO, targets. Be- 
cause the government believes in the public nature of environmental protection, it assumed prima- 
ry responsibility for developing a comprehensive response to climate change and for inducing 
changes in behavior from the various sectors of the society (interview with C.  Watanabe). Four 
national targets for greenhouse gas emissions are outlined in the Plan: 1) stabilization of CO, 
elnissions on a per capita basis by 2000 and beyond at 1990 levels; 2) stabilization of total CO, 
emissions in 2000 and beyond at about the same level as in 1990; 3) ensuring that CH, emissions 
do not exceed 1990 levels; 4) ensuring that N,O and other GHG emissions do not increase (OECD 
1994B). Though the Plan aims for stabilization of emissions by 2000, it nus t  be noted that this 
target is actually quite modest, since it allows for a 6 percent increase in emissions between 1990 
and 2000. The fact that CO, emissions had jumped 30 percent between 1987 and 1990 made the 
commitment even less stringent, as it used a base year with high per capita emissions. In addi- 
tion, the commitment was adopted through a government decision and never made into law by the 
Japanese parliament, which weakened it even more (Fermann 1994). 
The Action Plan relies heavily on such financial incentives as subsidies, tax breaks, and 
zero or  low interest loans. Broad in scope, it calls for a restructuring of several levels of Japa- 
nese society, including the transport system, urban and regional structures, production structures, 
energy supply structures, and the "realization of lifestyles" (Tanabe and Grubb 1991). 
With regard to the energy supply sector, the Plan advocates improvements in energy 
efficiency and energy conservation measures as well as the use of energy sources having low or 
no CO, emissions (e.g., substitution of fossil fuels with nuclear energy). It calls for the promo- 
tion of nuclear energy, taxation policies favoring investment in renewable energy sources, and 
subsidies to local city gas suppliers to convert to natural gas. It likewise contains measures to 
enhance CO, sinks; to increase research and monitoring of global warming; to develop and dis- 
seminate technology related to energy conservation and renewable energy sources and on technol- 
ogy to improve CO, emissions control and techniques for the disposal of CO,; to promote public 
awareness of the global warming issue; and to promote international cooperation on climate 
change activities. It further encourages each of Japan's ministries to develop climate change 
mitigation strategies for their particular sphere of interest (OECD 1994A and OECD 1994B). It is 
noteworthy that Japan chose not to adopt CO, taxes, owing to industrial and government concerns 
that such a tax may slow economic growth (Fermann 1994). 
Another pillar of the Japanese response to the global warming question has been research 
and development. Both government and industry believed that technology is an important means 
by which the country could realize further reduction in CO, emissions (Tanabe and Grubb 1991). 
The Japanese government has traditionally put a great deal of emphasis on the role of technologi- 
cal innovation in responding to various social, environmental and economic challenges. This is 
evidenced by the industrial policies that have been initiated by the Japanese government as far 
back as the early post-war years (Watanabe 1994). For example, in response to changing eco- 
nomic conditions and serious pollution problems in the 1960s, MITI in 1971 announced a new 
plan for Japan's industrial development. This plan, called "MITI's Vision for the 1970s," advo- 
cated a knowledge-intensive industrial structure calling for innovative research and development 
aimed at reducing dependence on materials and energy in production processes and consumption 
(Watanabe 1994). Other comprehensive government R&D programs have included the Sunshine 
Project on R&D on new energy technologies, (1974) and the Moonlight Project on energy conser- 
vation R&D (1978). In the 1970s, moreover, Japan reduced emissions of sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) by improving energy efficiency and emissions control through the introduc- 
tion of myriad new technologies, such as direct heavy oil desulphurization facilities, gas 
desulphurization facilities, and improved methods of emissions control. Consequently, atmospher- 
ic SO, density has decreased by one-sixth over the last twenty-five years (Watanabe 1994). 
With respect to the climate change issue, technology again became an important aspect of 
the Japanese response. At the end of 1992 MITI combined the Sunshine Project, the Moonlight 
Project, and its Global Environmental Technology Program, which it had established in 1989, to 
create a New Sunshine Program. The goal of this program was to reduce energy-related CO, 
emissions by 16 percent by 2010 and by 50 percent by 2030 over 1990 levels. The budget for 
lhis program for 1993 was 50 billion yen. It consisted of three main components: an innovative 
R&D program focused on technology to limit global warming; an international collaboration 
program on large projects aimed at such technologies as hydrogen conversion, low NOx lean-burn 
engines, and CO, fixation, absorption, and storage; and a cooperative R&D program to to assist 
developing countries respond to energy and environmental problems (OECD 1994B). Another 
product of Japan's preference for technological solutions was the establishment in 1990 of the 
Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth (RITE), which seeks to develop "a new 
system of industrial technology based on the perspective of harmony with the environment . . ." 
(RITE 1990). The main goals of the Institute are to diffuse environment-friendly and energy- 
related technologies and to develop innovative technologies for the preservation of the environment 
(RITE 1990). 
The Japanese government's involvement on the climate change issue was followed by 
interest in the private sector as well. Since 1990 many of Japan's largest companies have estab- 
lished global environment offices and have invested in global environmental technologies. A 1991 
survey revealed that 80 percent of Japan's major manufacturing and construction companies were 
investing in R&D on global environmental technologies (Schreurs 1994). In addition, the Japanese 
Federation of Economic Industries (Keidanren), the most influential industrial organization, an- 
nounced its own voluntary program to address the climate change issue in 1991. 
IV. Analysis of Cultural Theory as a Predictive Instrument 
We have seen how the U.S., Sweden, and Japan responded to the threat of global warm- 
ing. To what degree did these actions correspond to the projections of cultural theory? 
The Globul Coinnlons Question. How did the three countries view their role in managing 
the global commons? One would expect that an egalitarian culture would take an aggressive ap- 
proach to environmental problems owing to a concern for the welfare of future generations. Of the 
three countries analyzed here, Sweden was in fact the most willing to take action on the climate 
change issue and to call for changes in behavior (in the form of energy taxes). 
A market culture would be expected to be less interested in global issues for their own 
sake, but would be willing to act if i t  is not overly expensive to do so. What's more, market cul- 
tures view environmental risk as a legitimate cost of the entrepreneurial way of life. The United 
States behaved in a way that was consistent with this projection, as i t  refused to heed international 
calls for commitments on global warming (though i t  must be noted that some elements of U.S. 
society were in favor of action, but attaining the necessary consensus was virtually impossible). 
The calculation of risk can be seen in the U.S.' extensive use of econometric models to rationalize 
policy decisions. In the end, the U.S. refused to commit to substantive policy measures, owing to 
uncertainty about the nature of the problem and the potential economic costs of various abatement 
strategies. This reluctance to act may also be a function of the market culture's short-term, pres- 
ent-oriented approach. 
Hierarchies believe that environmental problems can be addressed through centralized 
government intervention aimed at coordinating economic and environmental objectives. Because 
hierarchies are inherently risk-averse, moreover, one expects caution in responding to environ- 
mental threats. Japan did react cautiously and was among the last of the major developed nations 
to make a commitment toward stabilizing emissions of greenhouse gases. The Japanese response 
consisted of a major centrally-directed national CO, reduction strategy. 
The Policy Making and Implementation Process. The second test of cultural theory is 
whether or not the theory can project the process by which policy is formulated in a given coun- 
try. In the case of egalitarian cultures, one expects that there will be considerable debate among 
various groups as the society struggles to achieve consensus on major issues. A wide range of 
views will be represented with emphasis on eventual compromise. Debate, based on information- 
sharing, was indeed the order of the day in Sweden, with the country's largest environmental 
organizations arguing on behalf of a carbon tax on the one hand, and industry, represented by the 
Federation of Swedish Industries (SI), arguing against such measures, on the other hand. While 
conflict clearly existed, both sides eventually reached a compromise without the level of discord 
so apparent in the U.S. debate. 
Cultural theory projects that consensus is extremely difficult to obtain in a market culture, 
and in the United States we have seen how various actors responded to the threat of climate 
change--each presenting a different set of goals and policy recommendations. The process was 
highly contentious, marked by long debates before Congress, within the scientific community, and 
in the press. Part of the reason for the U.S.' weak showing at various international conferences 
was that there was no agreement within society itself as to the seriousness of the problem or to the 
most appropriate solution. No side was willing to compromise, and in the end, economic (mar- 
ket) concerns took precedence over environmental concerns. This is consistent with what one 
might expect from a market culture, where a premium is placed on individual values and financial 
interests. 
The process of global warming policy development in Japan was similarly consistent with 
what one would expect from cultural theory. Although there was some debate regarding the 
appropriateness of various proposed policy measures, most of this discussion took place within the 
government bureaucracy, and as we have seen, once the powerful Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry got behind the issue, substantial policy actions quickly followed. Though the Envi- 
ronment Agency was the first government body to stress the importance of CO, reduction policies, 
it wasn't until MITI realized the potential international significance of the issue that a national cli- 
mate change policy was put into place. A top-down approach followed, with MITI designing 
policies affecting virtually every sector of the national economy. 
Policy Instruments. The third test of cultural theory is its ability to project the choice of 
policy instruments. In an egalitarian society, one would expect to find a combination of informa- 
tion and regulation. In fact, however, Sweden responded to the climate change issue by intro- 
ducing economic instruments in the form of a CO, tax to supplement existing regulations. By 
raising prices, the tax discouraged the use of fossil fuels. (This illustrates the strong market ten- 
dencies at work in Swedish society.) No new regulations were imposed. lnformation also played 
only a minor role as a policy instrument in Sweden prior to the signing of the Rio Agreement in 
1992. However, in 1993 the Swedish government allocated SEK 5 million for climate-related 
information and education to increase the level of knowledge among the general public concerning 
the effects of climate change and to educate them on preventive measures and the importance of 
individual behavior (e.g., using public transportation, conserving electricity). 
Owing to the individualistlmarket orientation ascribed to the United States by cultural 
theory, one would expect market mechanisms, such as tradeable permits and taxes incentives, as 
well as research and development, to be the primary policy instruments. Specifically, tax breaks, 
implicit subsidies designed to encourage behaviors by not taxing them, are likely to be most suc- 
cessful in market cultures, since in the U.S. the imposition of new taxes is usually vigorously 
opposed. A carbon tax that was proposed in 1987, for instance, was soundly rejected. Such a tax 
was similarly voted down again in 1993. Because Americans respond more favorably to incen- 
tives, EPACT and the subsequent U.S. Climate Change Action Plan, used them h e a ~ i l y . ~  Such 
measures can also be introduced at relatively little cost. Research was also selected as the core of 
the U.S. national climate change strategy. Both Presidents Bush and Reagan advocated the need 
for additional research on the global warming issue and expressed confidence that new technolo- 
gies would enable the country to respond effectively should the threat turn out to be real. Under 
George Bush, especially, the U.S. climate change budget increased substantially. 
Cultural theory tells us hierarchies may be expected to favor a combination of command 
and fiscal policy instruments. Because their orientation is top-down, they are inclined to adopt 
command measures, but the pragmatic reality is that governments must ensure industrial coopera- 
tion, so they will also introduce market mechanisms to appease industry. In fact, many industrial 
leaders have great influence with MITI and were able to ensure that industry's concerns were 
The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) also called for voluntary CO, reductions on the part of indus- 
try, thereby allowing firms maximum flexibility to devise innovative programs to achieve national goals. 
This is an interesting manifestation of the U.S.' market orientation. Because it wasn't drawn up until 1993, 
however, further discussion of the CCAP is beyond the scope of this paper. 
heard in the global warming policy debate. This resulted in Japan's heavy reliance on fiscal mea- 
sures, such as tax breaks and low interest loans, as the major policy instrument to reduce emis- 
sions of greenhouse gases. However, in defiance of cultural theory's projections, Japan did not 
rely much on regulation to bring about change. Instead the Japanese used a combination of fiscal 
measures and R&D. 
Speed of Policy-Making and Implementation. The fourth test of cultural theory projects 
the speed with which policies are actually implemented. One would expect a great deal of varia- 
tion between the three cultural types, with hierarchies and egalitarians moving quickly and market 
cultures moving slowly. Implementation of environmental policies in Sweden was in fact relative- 
ly swift. The Riksdag first debated the issue in 1988; the same year C02  reduction goals were 
established (though they were subsequently modified). Within three years a new CO, tax and a 
revised energy strategy designed to reduce CO, emissions were also in place. 
In the U.S. by contrast, implementation was slow, mainly because there was no agree- 
ment regarding the appropriate policy measures and the level of effort and expenditure needed to 
enforce them. While some C0,-reducing policies were introduced through the passage of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the global warming element of 
these initiatives was mostly coincidental. A substantive policy measure with real commitments 
was not introduced until October of 1993, several years after the debate on climate change had 
conlmenced. In addition, the U. S. ' main policy instrument, research and development, faced 
additional challenges on Capitol Hill, as legislators, heavily influenced by interest groups, debated 
the U. S. budget for climate-related research. 
Like Sweden, Japan moved quickly on the climate change issue. The Action Plan was 
drawn up within two years after the issue came to public attention. This is because decision- 
making was mainly at the government level, so there was little room for disagreement from out- 
side parties, as was the case in the U.S. Once the government had decided to react, it  could 
move freely to implement the policies necessary to respond to the global warming problem. 
Government agencies undertook measures to reduce greenhouse gases, enhance carbon sinks, 
accelerate scientific research, and disseminate appropriate technologies. Japan also began a pro- 
gram of urban tree planting and made improvements in transportation facilities to increase energy 
efficiency. 
The Role of Technology. Does technology have a role in responding to environmental 
threats? If so, who within a society should lead the drive to innovate? According to cultural 
theory, an egalitarian culture will view environmental threats as sufficiently serious to warrant 
major behavioral changes and will not put much reliance on the development of new technologies 
to solve perceived problems. However, those technologies which are deployed originate not from 
a large central bureaucracy, but rather from a host of disparate sources. Like the other two coun- 
tries discussed in this paper, Sweden has an extensive climate change research program as well as 
various programs aimed at enhancing energy efficiency and developing alternative energy sources. 
In some areas of energy technology R&D, in fact, Sweden is a world leader. Most of these pro- 
grams are sponsored by the national government. In this sense, Sweden did not act in accordance 
with cultural theory's projections, although in the mid-1990s there are virtually no industrialized 
countries which do not have substantial national research and development programs. 
Market cultures will take a very positive view of technology. They believe that new 
advances in science and technology will overcome most potential threats to the environment. In 
the U.S., research and development were emphasized both as a means of reducing uncertainty 
about the global warming problem (recall the conclusion of the Marshall Institute report), and of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions through the development of new environmental technologies. 
While government is heavily involved in funding research and technology development, much of 
the innovation actually takes place in the private sector, where the market guides industry's tech- 
nology investment decisions. That the United States has historically refused to implement an 
industrial policy, whereby the government would decide which industries should be developed, 
further indicates U.S. commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and market principles. 
Cultural theory implies that hierarchies will tend to regard environmental problems as 
serious but manageable through centralized government intervention. Such attitudes can indeed be 
ascribed to Japan, which through its centralized bureaucracy having its purest expression in MITI, 
developed a comprehensive, long-term plan for dealing with the climate change threat. Technolo- 
gy was viewed as having a major role in mitigating environmental threats. As we have seen, the 
Japanese response called for a large-scale, technology-based research and development program 
geared toward improvements in energy and environmental technologies. The impetus for imova- 
tion thus originated within the government bureaucracy. 
Litnitations of Cultural Theory. Thus far cultural theory has quite accurately projected 
countries' attitudes and behaviors in several key areas. However, it does have limitations. For 
example, Sweden's primary policy instrument vis a vis global warming was taxation, but the CO, 
tax levied contained many loopholes for industry. In this sense Sweden behaved much like a 
market culture. Similarly, the U.S. exhibited some very strong hierarchical tendencies, and the 
important role played by individual actors cannot be overlooked. President Bush's powerful Chief 
of Staff, John Sununu, for example, exerted a strong influence on the climate change policy pro- 
cess prior to Rio. Because he personally did not believe in the possibility of anthropogenic global 
warming, Sununu was able to undermine the efforts of other government officials, such as repre- 
sentatives from the EPA and DOE, who advocated a stronger climate change policy. When he 
saw the EPA's first draft of U.S. climate policy which was to be presented to the IPCC, Sununu 
tore the document up and rewrote the document according to his own ideas. He also aggressively 
undercut individuals in the Administration whose views he felt were too sympathetic to those of 
the more proactive European countries (Andresen 1993). 
Political parties in the U.S. also are associated with certain policy preferences. Republi- 
can administrations, such as those of Reagan and Bush, are probably more likely to favor market 
mechanisms than are Democratic administrations, such as the Carter Administration, which was 
known for its more regulatory approach to environmental policy. Democrat-led governments 
often resemble egalitarian cultures in their desire to rein in unrestrained capitalism and promote a 
more equitable distribution of national wealth. Similarly, Japan also exhibited traits normally 
associated with a different cultural type--a market culture--in its use of market mechanisms to 
reduce emissions. Owing to such contradictions, then, one sees that cultural theory alone cannot 
account for countries' choices of policy instruments. 
Other variables besides cultural dynamics are likely influence national behavior. For 
example, while Japan's response to the climate change issue was consistent with cultural theory's 
projections for speed of implementation, it is important to note that not all hierarchies move 
quickly. Top-down decision-making styles do not always engender swift action. Some hierar- 
chies, including the former Soviet Union, are large, inefficient, and impoverished; implementation 
of government-directed policies is usually slow. This suggests that cultural theory by itself is not 
adequate in explaining national behaviors. 
Another weakness of the application of cultural theory is that the theory often lends itself 
to different interpretations. For example, Sweden imposed a carbon tax which contained breaks 
for solne industries. But cultural theory tells us that an egalitarian society places high value on 
uniform application of rules and regulations. One could therefore argue that Sweden's unequal 
taxation policy favors certain (powerful) groups, pointing to strong hierarchical elements within 
the society. On the other hand, one could also argue that such tax breaks represent the natural 
tendency of an egalitarian-dominant culture to level the playing field. There are many instances 
where events can be explained in such a way that they suit--or do not suit--the tenets of cultural 
theory, depending on the analyst's point of view. 
In addition, it is often difficult to quantify such abstractions as "strife" and "consensus." 
That is, since virtually no decision can be made without some dissent from some source, and since 
consent is often grudging, it can be difficult to determine at what point a country ceases to exhibit 
the characteristics of a consensus-seeking egalitarian culture and takes on the characteristics of the 
more aggressive market culture. The subjective nature of this determination can greatly compli- 
cate the task of assigning cultural categories. 
There are several reasons why cultural theory may not satisfactorily explain what hap- 
pened in each of the three countries discussed in this paper. One reason is that the theory was 
originally developed for application at the individual or group--as opposed to national--level; the 
national dimension adds an additional layer of complexity. Like all models, moreover, cultural 
theory represents an oversimplification of highly complex systems. No country will fit into an 
exact mold of a given cultural type: all nations exhibit elements of the other cultures. The theory 
oilly suggests that there is a tendency of a given nation to belong to one of the three major cul- 
tural types. While cultural theory enables us to explain differences in how countries make and 
implement policies, it cannot, as a model, explain all the multiple interactions which may lead to 
outcomes different than those projected. When a model cannot be captured mathematically, i.e., 
if it iilvolves qualitative rather than quantitative data, such limitations appear significant. 
V. Conclusion 
As this paper has shown, before the Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Sweden, the United States, and Japan were already well on the 
way toward establishing an appropriate response to the GHG problem, though ways of addressing 
the issue varied markedly between countries. Each country sought solutions appropriate to its 
particular national culture. 
This paper used a series of five tests on three countries to verify the claims of cultural 
theory with respect to the global warming problem. Table 1 summarizes the projections of the 
theory; Table 2 shows whether the actual outcomes corresponded to the expectations. While the 
theory cannot adequately explain all aspects of a country's behavior, there were enough consisten- 
cies to enable us to conclude that a majority of its projections held. The theory was strongest in 
projecting the nature of the policy processes and weakest in projecting choices of policy instru- 
ments, since each country employed a combination of various types of instruments, most notably 
fiscal incentives and research and development. 
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Table 2 National Cultural Theory Scoreboard: 
Did nations respond according to projections of cultural theory on each of the five questions? 
Most important is the fact that cultural theory enabled us to see that, in dealing with mat- 
ters of international concern, every country approaches the negotiating table with different goals 
and ideas of what are realistic and desirable outcomes. Such differences in outlook can be as- 
cribed in large part to differences in political cultures, which influence how a country will frame 
an issue, who will play the most significant role in shaping the debate, what the policy making 
process will be like, and which instruments will be chosen to achieve the desired result. In the 
case of climate change, we have seen how Sweden regarded the issue as potentially serious and 
early on made a commitment to reduce its production of greenhouse gases. Relevant policy mea- 
sures quickly supported the decision. The United States, by contrast, was less willing to accept 
the reality of a global warming threat and postponed making important policy decisions that could 
have an impact on the economy. The tendency of individuals in the U.S. to attempt to influence 
national decision-making in their own favor meant that the U.S. government was unable to take 
decisive action on the global warming question; hence, its response was viewed by other countries 
as weak. Japan responded in a similarly conservative fashion, though ultimately it was motivated 
to act primarily as a result international pressure, rather than out of concern about the global 
warming problem itself. Its plan to stabilize per capita CO, emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 has 
similarly been criticized for lack of rigor. Nonetheless, Japan did respond with a major central- 
ized technology-based program to enhance energy efficiency. 
While it does not fully describe any one country, cultural theory nonetheless can help ac- 
count for some of the differences in national attitudes toward problems of international concern. 
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pressing global issue. It may further assist those individuals charged with formulating internation- 
al agreements in designing regimes which are of optimum effectiveness. The theory implies that 
international negotiators have two choices when developing an international regime: they can 
design agreements which allow countries maximum discretion in implementing policies domesti- 
cally, or they can make policy recommendations on a country-by-country basis. 
Since cultural theory acknowledges that each nation has different cultural constraints in 
addressing national problems, negotiators may wish to design agreements which contain few spe- 
cific requirements, thereby allowing countries to make the policy decisions most compatible with 
their own cultural types. For example, such an agreement may set targets and timetables that 
countries would need to meet, but it would not contain any specific prescriptions for how coun- 
tries should accomplish those goals. In other words, the agreement would contain no provisions 
on mandatory policy measures, such as taxes or regulations, which countries must apply to meet 
the treaty's objectives. The existing Convention of Climate Change is an example of this type of 
agreement, except that it is a framework agreement only and as such does not contain specific 
targets and timetables; discretion for appropriate policy measures lies with the individual member 
nations. 
The second option would mean that negotiators would need to assign obligations to coun- 
tries based on an agreed-upon understanding of how each society operates. Each country would 
propose to an international committee what it believes its dominant culture to be, or each country 
could propose its own package of policy measures to meet some broad international obligation. 
After this has been established, the committee would evaluate the various packages to ensure that 
they are generally consistent with broader international goals. However, details of implementation 
would be left to the individual countries. For example, some countries may be inclined to employ 
a combination of regulation and information, while others may be more suited to a regime consist- 
ing primarily of fiscal incentives. But the package would not be limited to domestic actions 
alone: countries would be allowed to act abroad as well, as long as activities undertaken are 
consistent with international objectives, the culture of the implementing nation, and the develop- 
ment goals of the host country. The U.S.,  for instance, because of its preference for market 
mechanisms, may favor joint implementation schemes. Sweden, in addition to its domesitic ac- 
tions, may elect to assist developing countries with population control, a goal entirely consistent 
with the egalitarian viewpoint. An approach such as this not only takes into account different 
cultures, but it also recognizes that global warming is a commons problem, and greenhouse gas 
reductions can occur anywhere. 
It is conceivable that an arrangement such as the one described above, while requiring 
more time to design, would have a greater chance of success, since countries would be forced to 
give thought to selecting policy measures during treaty formulation, instead of afterwards. In- 
deed, some treaties are ineffective because, even though negotiators commit to things internation- 
ally, they are unable to implement them once back home, owing to domestic opposition. An 
agreement such as this would take domestic factors into considerations early enough to minimize 
potential internal obstacles. 
Whichever option negotiators may choose, cultural theory offers a potentially useful new 
means of arriving at agreements aimed at managing the global commons and should be taken 
seriously in the development of international regimes. 
Because it recognizes the importance of cultural influences in national decision-making, 
moreover, cultural theory goes beyond the traditional comparative political economy approach to 
explaining national policy choices. Political economy studies ascribe differences in national ap- 
proaches to conlrnon problems to differing political systems. In so doing, these studies overlook 
one of the most important reasons why countries behave the way they do: variations in national 
cultures. This paper reminds us that the influence of culture and social values cannot be neglect- 
ed, and while cultural theory by itself cannot fully describe any country, i t  can be used as one tool 
in a varied arsenal for explaining differing domestic responses and designing useful agreements. 
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